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Matched Preferences and Values: 
A New Approach to Selecting 
Legal Surrogates 
NINA A. KOHN* 
ABSTRACT
Every day, hospitals are filled with incapacitated patients whose 
healthcare decisions are made by other people.  The law recognizes such 
decisions as the patients’ own and, accordingly, the primary purpose of 
surrogate decisionmakers is to make the decisions that patients would 
make if able.  Unfortunately, surrogate decisionmakers frequently make 
choices for patients that are inconsistent with patient wishes.  Indeed,
social psychology literature on surrogate decisionmaking finds a stronger
correlation between surrogates’ decisions for patients and what surrogates 
would want for themselves than between surrogates’ decisions and what
patients actually would want.  Although others have treated surrogates’ 
tendency to project their own preferences and values on patients as a
barrier to appropriate decisionmaking, this Article shows how savvy patients,
advocates, and policymakers can capitalize on this tendency to improve 
healthcare decisionmaking. Specifically, it proposes that surrogate 
* © 2015 Nina A. Kohn. Nina A. Kohn, Associate Dean for Research and David M.
Levy L’48 Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. J.D., Harvard Law
School; A.B., Princeton University.  The Author thanks Jill Cramer and William Woodworth 
for their research assistance.  An earlier version of this Article was presented at the Petrie-
Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School’s 
Annual Conference in May 2014.  The Article is dedicated to the memory of the late Professor 
Jeremy Blumenthal, who was its intended co-author. This Article builds on ideas generated 
while co-authoring earlier work with Professor Blumenthal. 
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decisionmakers for health care be selected based, at least in part, on the 
extent to which they share patients’ treatment preferences. Where it is not
possible to compare treatment preferences, or where an individual cares 
less about particular treatment decisions than about consistency with a set
of values, surrogates should be selected based on shared values.  Incorporating 
this approach into advance planning processes and the statutory law
governing the selection of guardians and default surrogate decisionmakers
could both increase the likelihood that decisions made are those patients
would want made, and facilitate more flexible, context-appropriate treatment 
decisions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although individuals generally have a legal right to make their own
healthcare decisions,1 many are unable to exercise that right directly. 
Whether because of an acute medical condition or a cognitive disability,
the reality for many patients is that their healthcare decisions are made by 
other people. Indeed, one study found that nearly a quarter of hospitalized
1. This right is well defined in the context of the refusal of treatment. See Cruzan 
v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79 (1990) (recognizing that the Constitution 
protects the right to refuse medical treatment). The extent to which individuals have a
constitutional right to affirmatively choose treatment, however, is less clear. See B. Jessie
Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 
313–18 (2007) (discussing constitutional jurisprudence as to the right to select treatment). 
Nevertheless, the right to select among treatment options is recognized both in the common law
of informed consent and in state statutes setting forth the circumstances under which a 
person can be denied the right to make those decisions because of incapacity, including, 
for example, those statutes governing guardianship of incapacitated persons. 
400
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older adults facing one or more major treatment decisions had all such
decisions made by a surrogate decisionmaker, and that nearly half had a 
surrogate decisionmaker involved in at least some treatment decisions.2 
The law recognizes healthcare decisions made by surrogate decisionmakers 
as legally binding and constitutionally protected because the law views 
decisions made by surrogates as the patients’ own decisions.3  Consistent 
with this perspective, whether the surrogate be an agent appointed by the 
patient, a guardian appointed by a court, or a default surrogate decisionmaker 
selected in accordance with state statutory law, it is generally agreed that 
the surrogate’s primary goal should be to reach the decision the patient
would have made if capable.  The conventional wisdom is that such surrogate 
decisionmakers, therefore, should be chosen based on their relationship to 
the patient, trustworthiness, and willingness to follow the patient’s directions.4 
Unfortunately, as this Article shows, the extensive empirical literature 
on healthcare decisionmaking suggests that selecting surrogates based on
such traits is often insufficient to protect patients’ wishes.  Even when
instructed otherwise, surrogate decisionmakers frequently make treatment 
decisions for patients that are inconsistent with patients’ preferences.
Moreover, the commonly recommended strategies for improving congruence 
between patients’ preferences and surrogates’ decisions appear to have limited
effect. Indeed, because surrogates tend to project their own preferences 
when making decisions for others, the best predictor of a surrogate’s 
decision on behalf of a patient appears to be the surrogate’s preferences 
for himself or herself in the same situation. 
While other researchers have treated surrogates’ tendency to project as 
a barrier to reaching appropriate treatment decisions, this Article shows 
that it can actually be used to improve surrogate decisionmaking.  Specifically, 
it argues that selecting surrogates based, at least in part, on shared preferences 
and shared values can increase the likelihood that surrogates’ treatment
decisions will be consistent with patients’ preferences.  This Article, therefore,
proposes that individuals be encouraged to consider potential surrogates’
own values and treatment preferences when appointing a surrogate and
2. Alexia M. Torke et al., Scope and Outcomes of Surrogate Decision Making 
Among Hospitalized Older Adults, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 370, 372–73 (2014)
(reporting on the frequency of surrogate decisionmaking for older adults admitted to the 
hospital for at least forty-eight hours). 
3. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277–80 (treating the right to refuse treatment as 
including the right to have a legal surrogate refuse treatment on one’s behalf). 
4. See infra note 16. 
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that states require that guardians and default surrogate decisionmakers be 
selected based in part on their personal preferences and values. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part II describes how surrogate
decisionmaking currently occurs in the healthcare context, including the
legal processes by which surrogates are selected.  Part III reviews the 
social science literature examining the extent to which surrogates make 
decisions that patients would make if able and the reasons why they often 
fail to do so. Part IV reviews existing strategies for improving the rate at 
which surrogates make the decisions patients would want made on their 
behalf. Finally, Part V proposes a shared preferences and values approach 
to surrogate selection as a mechanism for increasing the likelihood that
surrogates will make the decisions patients would want made, and explores 
how and why such an approach should be operationalized. 
II. OVERVIEW OF SURROGATE DECISIONMAKING IN THE 
HEALTH CARE CONTEXT
When patients lack capacity to make a healthcare decision for themselves, 
the law allows a third party to be authorized to make that decision on 
behalf on behalf of those individuals. Legally recognized surrogates for 
healthcare decisionmaking fall into three broad categories. 
First, there are health care agents appointed by patients prior to the onset
of cognitive incapacity.  Patients can appoint their own surrogate by
executing a type of advance directive known alternatively as a “health care 
proxy” or a “power of attorney for health care.”5  These documents authorize
another person to make decisions for the person executing the document 
(the “principal”) if the principal cannot make or communicate medical 
choices. As part of a health care proxy, principals can also include instructions 
as to particular decisions they want made, including instructions related
to the use of life-sustaining technology.6 
Second, surrogates can be appointed by a court, most commonly through a
guardianship proceeding.  Such surrogates are typically called “guardians.”7 
5. This Article uses the term health care proxy because it is less confusing to the 
general public than the term power of attorney for health care, which tends to be confused
with power of attorney for financial decisions. 
6.  See, e.g., UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 4 (1994) (including a standardized 
form providing for such instructions). 
7. Most states use the term guardian to refer to someone appointed to make personal 
and health care decisions for an incapacitated person, as does the Uniform Adult Guardianship
and Protective Proceedings Act. See  UNIF. ADULT GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE
PROCEEDINGS ACT § 102(4) (1997).  Many states also use the term guardian to refer 
to someone appointed to make financial decisions for a person who has been adjudicated 
to lack capacity to make such decisions.  See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.03(a) 
(McKinney 2004).  The term conservator, by contrast, is used by many states to refer to 
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A guardian may be appointed only after a court determines that an individual
is incapacitated and in need of a guardian.8  An incapacitated individual 
who previously engaged in adequate advance planning should generally
not need a guardian because the individual will already have an appointed 
healthcare agent available to make needed decisions.9 
Third, surrogates can be authorized to act by state statutory law even 
though they have neither been appointed by the patient nor by a court of
law. Despite continued efforts by the medical community, legal community,
and even the federal government10 to encourage the use of health care 
proxies, most adults do not have one.11  A substantial majority of states 
have addressed this situation by enacting statutes that authorize default
decisionmakers for incapacitated persons who lack a valid health care 
someone appointed to make financial decisions, and the Uniform Adult Guardianship and 
Protective Proceedings Act also takes this approach.  See UNIF. ADULT GUARDIANSHIP AND
PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 102(2) (1997). However, there are a few states that use 
the term conservator to refer to someone appointed to make both financial and personal 
decisions, and Louisiana uses the term interdiction. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 389 
(2000).
8. A person can have significantly diminished capacity without being incapacitated. 
States have different standards for what constitutes incapacity for the purpose of guardianship. 
The modern approach is to consider individuals’ functional limitations, not simply their 
medical diagnosis when determining capacity. For further discussion of different approaches,
see NINA A. KOHN, ELDER LAW: POLICY, PRACTICE, AND PROBLEMS 152 (2014).
9. See, e.g., In re Maher, 621 N.Y.S.2d 617, 622–24 (App. Div. 1994) (refusing to 
impose a guardianship where the allegedly incapacitated person had successfully engaged 
in advance planning). 
10. The federal government imposes requirements on health care institutions to
inform patients about advance directives and related rights. See 42 C.F.R. § 489.102
(2013).
11. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND ADVANCE
CARE PLANNING: REPORT TO CONGRESS 13 (2008) (reviewing studies on the frequency of
advance directives and concluding that “studies find that only 18–36 percent of Americans
have completed an advance directive”  and that there was a low rate of advance directive 
completion even among high-need populations such that “[f]ewer than half of severely or
terminally ill patients had an advance directive in their medical record, and among individuals
with chronic illnesses, only one in three completed an advance directive”); Anil Kumar et
al., Prevalence of Use of Advance Directives, Health Care Proxy, Legal Guardian, and
Living Will in 512 Patients Hospitalized in a Cardiac Care Unit/Intensive Care Unit in 
Two Community Hospitals, 6 ARCHIVES MED. SCI. 188, 189 (2010) (finding that only 22% 
of cardiac patients in two community hospitals had an advance directive and only 19% had
a health care proxy); Bernard Lo & Robert Steinbrook, Resuscitating Advance Directives, 164
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1501, 1502 (2004) (reporting that approximately 25% of patients
have advance directives); Christopher B. Rosnick & Sandra L. Reynolds, Thinking Ahead: 
Factors Associated with Executing Advance Directives, 15 J. AGING & HEALTH 409, 411
(2003) (surveying studies on advance directive frequency). 
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proxy. Such statutes typically create a priority list indicating which persons 
will be selected as surrogates for patients who lack capacity but who do 
not otherwise have an appointed surrogate.12  Individuals appointed under
such statutes are referred to as “default” surrogate decisionmakers.13 
Although the process by which surrogates are chosen varies depending 
on the type of surrogate, there is considerable overlap in the identity of 
those chosen to serve as surrogates. Across all three categories, close
relatives, specifically spouses and adult children, are most commonly
selected as surrogates.14 
Although persons executing a health care proxy are free, with only
minor statutory exceptions, to appoint anyone they choose, they typically 
appoint someone who is closely related to them.  Indeed, research suggests
that the vast majority, perhaps as many as nine out of ten individuals, 
select either their spouse or an adult child as their healthcare agent.15  This
approach is consistent with the advice typically offered by attorneys, medical 
professionals, and others who help patients execute advance directives;
12. See Nina A. Kohn & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Designating Health Care 
Decisionmakers for Patients Without Advance Directives: A Psychological Critique, 42
GA. L. REV. 979, 984–86 (2008) (outlining the range of such statutes). 
13. Id. at 984. 
14. See infra notes 15, 27, 18, & 20 and accompanying text. 
15. See William D. Smucker et al., Modal Preferences Predict Elderly Patients’ 
Life-Sustaining Treatment Choices as Well as Patients’ Chosen Surrogates Do, 20 MED.
DECISION MAKING 271, 273 (2000) (reporting that 91% of patients chose a spouse or child
as their surrogate).  Studies in which subjects are asked to name or choose their surrogates
show similar patterns. See, e.g., Angela Fagerlin et al., Projection in Surrogate Decisions
About Life-Sustaining Medical Treatments, 20 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 166, 171 (2001) (finding 
that 60% selected spouses and 31% selected adult children when asked to select a surrogate);
Jan Hare et al., Agreement Between Patients and Their Self-Selected Surrogates on Difficult 
Medical Decisions, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1049, 1050 (1992) (finding that 72% 
selected spouses and 10% selected adult children when asked to select a surrogate); Dallas 
M. High, Standards for Surrogate Decision Making: What the Elderly Want, 17 J. LONG-
TERM CARE ADMIN. 8, 9 (1989) (indicating a strong patient preference for spouses and
adult children as surrogates); M. Kay Libbus & Cynthia Russell, Congruence of Decisions 
Between Patients & Their Potential Surrogates About Life-Sustaining Therapies, 27 J. 
NURSING SCHOLARSHIP 135, 137 (1995) (finding, that all selected surrogates were relatives 
of the patient and that 53% were spouses in a study where patients were asked to choose a 
surrogate); Karem Príncipe-Rodríguez et al., Substituted Judgment: Should Life-Support
Decisions Be Made by a Surrogate?, 18 P.R. HEALTH SCI. J. 405, 406 (1999) (in a small 
study of terminally-ill patients at a medical center for veterans, finding that 45% selected 
wives and 20% selected adult children as surrogates); Jeremiah Suhl et al., Myth of 
Substituted Judgment: Surrogate Decision Making Regarding Life Support Is Unreliable, 
154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 90, 93 tbl.4 (1994) (reporting that the majority of surrogates 
who had been selected by patients being studied were spouses). 
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patients are generally advised to select a surrogate who knows them well, 
who is familiar with their wishes, and whom they trust.16 
Courts appointing guardians also typically appoint relatives of the
incapacitated person.  State statutory law governing the guardianship 
16.  This conventional wisdom can be seen in the advice offered by a wide array of 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations offering advice to the public about
advance directives. See, e.g., CTR. FOR PRACTICAL BIOETHICS, CARING CONVERSATIONS:
MAKING YOUR HEALTHCARE WISHES KNOWN 8 (2013), http://www.practicalbioethics. 
org/files/caring-conversations/Caring-Conversations.pdf [http://perma.cc/RC2E-3K5U]
(stating in its advice to those executing a health care directive that, “A simple question to 
consider is, ‘Who can I trust to make the decision I would make for myself?’” and 
recommending that, “Honest and frequent communication is the most important thing you 
can do to help your Agent make decisions for you that you would make for yourself”); 
COMPASSION & CHOICES, THE GOOD TO GO RESOURCE GUIDE 6 (2012), https://www. 
compassionandchoices.org/userfiles/Good-To-Go-Resource-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
YRZ6-E79C] (“As you consider potential agents, ask yourself, ‘Are they assertive?  Do 
they live nearby?  Are they comfortable talking about death? Will they respect my values?’”);
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Advance Care Plan Considerations, LONGTERM 
CARE.GOV, http://longtermcare.gov/how-to-decide/advance-care-plan-considerations/ [http:// 
perma.cc/3RA2-5XMD] (last visited Apr. 20, 2015) (instructing individuals selecting
decision makers for health care to “[c]hoose someone who will understand and be able to 
carry out your wishes even if they include stopping life-sustaining treatment”); End-of-
Life Care Decision Making, ELDER L. ANSWERS, http://www.elderlawanswers.com/end-
of-life-care-decision-making-12045 [http://perma.cc/46HK-YYFA] (last updated Apr. 20, 
2015) (“Since the agent will have the authority to make medical decisions in the event the 
principal is unable to make such decisions for him- or herself, the agent should be a family
member or friend that the principal trusts to follow his or her instructions.”). 
Likewise, the American Bar Association’s Commission on Law and Aging, a leader in
elder law policy, has recommended that individuals choose their surrogate based on the 
following criteria:
1. Meets the legal criteria in your state for acting as agent or proxy or
representative. . . .
2. Would be willing to speak on your behalf. 
3. Would be able to act on your wishes and separate his/her own feelings 
from yours. 
4. Lives close by or could travel to be at your side if needed. 
5. Knows you well and understands what’s important to you.
6. Is someone you trust with your life. 
7. Will talk with you now about sensitive issues and will listen to your wishes. 
8. Will likely be available long into the future. 
9. Would be able to handle conflicting opinions between family members, 
friends, and medical personnel. 
10. Can be a strong advocate in the face of an unresponsive doctor or institution. 
AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON LAW AND AGING, CONSUMER’S TOOL KIT FOR HEALTH CARE






















   
 
  
     







    





        
process generally requires courts to consider a hierarchy of persons— 
commonly any person or entity nominated by the individual, followed by
the person’s spouse, adult child, parent, and other relatives or friends.17 
While a court may appoint a nonrelative, including a professional guardian,
such appointments are the exception not the rule.18 
Similarly, default surrogate statutes also give preference to close family 
members.  Most states with default surrogate laws have created a statutory
“priority list” indicating which persons may serve as surrogates in the 
absence of an advance directive.19  Typically, the priority list is composed 
of members of the immediate family, starting with the spouse.  Some 
states make allowances for nontraditional families by including domestic 
partners or “close friends.”20  A number of states also allow a physician to 
make a decision where no surrogate is available.21 Other states give
physicians a role in selecting the surrogate.22  States generally require
healthcare providers to adhere strictly to the state’s priority list in identifying 
default surrogate decisionmakers for incapacitated patients.23  This rigid
priority list approach is consistent with the Uniform Health Care Decisions
Act (UHCDA).  Under the UHCDA, if a patient does not have a designated 
surrogate or if that surrogate is not “reasonably available,” a health care 
provider can obtain consent to medical treatment (or refusal of consent) 
from “any member of the following classes of the patient’s family who is 
17. See KOHN, supra note 8, at 145. 
18. There is a remarkable dearth of data on adult guardianship; however, all 
indications are that the vast majority of guardians are family members of the ward.  In 
2009, the National Center for State Courts’ Center for Elders and the Courts surveyed 
court personnel—including judges—working in the guardianship arena.  Based on the 
responses to the survey, respondents reported that 72% of guardians were family members 
in jurisdictions where public guardians are available and 81% of guardians were family
members in jurisdictions lacking a public guardian. See BRENDA K. UEKERT, NAT’L CTR.
FOR STATE COURTS, ADULT GUARDIANSHIP COURT DATA AND ISSUES: RESULTS FROM AN
ONLINE SURVEY 19 (2010), http://www.guardianship.org/reports/Guardianship_Survey_
Report.pdf.  The report cautioned, however, that the sample was not representative of court 
personnel nationwide. Id. at 4. 
19. See Kohn & Blumenthal, supra note 12, at 983. 
20. Id. at 984–85. 
21. Id. at 985. 
22. Id.
 23. Id. There are some exceptions. For example, in Tennessee, the priority list is 
merely to be given “consideration” when selecting a surrogate “who has exhibited special
care and concern for the patient, who is familiar with the patient’s personal values, who is 
reasonably available, and who is willing to serve.”  TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1806(c)(2)– 
(3) (2004).  Similarly, in Colorado and Hawaii, specified interested persons are called upon 
to decide amongst themselves who will serve as the surrogate based on who among them 
is close to the patient and is most likely to be familiar with the patient’s wishes. COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5-103(4)(a) (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327E-5(d) (1999 &
Supp. 2007). 
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reasonably available, in descending order of priority . . . : (1) the spouse,
unless legally separated; (2) an adult child; (3) a parent; or (4) an adult 
brother or sister.”24  If none of these individuals are reasonably available, 
any other adult “who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient, 
who is familiar with the patient’s personal values, and who is reasonably
available may act as surrogate.”25 
There is also considerable overlap among the systems as to how a 
surrogate is instructed to make decisions.  Where the law articulates a 
decisionmaking standard for surrogate decisionmakers for health care,
state statutes generally require surrogates to make decisions using substituted 
judgment,26 at least where the patient’s wishes are actually known and 
often where they are reasonably ascertainable; that is, they should make 
the decision they believe the patient would make if able to do so.  This
approach requires the surrogate to adhere to the patient’s preferences, which 
may not be feasible where there is insufficient information about those 
preferences, and requires a degree of speculation even when prior discussions 
have occurred. Thus, the UHCDA instructs surrogates to make health
care decisions “in accordance with the principal’s individual instructions, 
if any, and other wishes to the extent known to the agent.  Otherwise, the 
agent shall make the decision in accordance with the agent’s determination 
of the principal’s best interest.”27  This is the majority approach to
decisionmaking by appointed health care agents.28 
24. See UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 5 (1993).  If more than one member 
of a class assumes surrogate decisionmaking authority, the will of the majority of the 
members of that class governs. Id.
 25. Id.
26. Notably, the law is often unclear about such decisionmaking standards. Cf. 
Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S. Whitton, The UPC Substituted Judgment/Best Interest 
Standard for Guardian Decisions: A Proposal for Reform, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 739,
742–43 (2012) (finding that a majority of the states do not articulate a decisionmaking
standard for guardians, at least with regard to decisions other than healthcare decisions, 
and indicating that a number of states do not articulate a standard even for guardians’ 
health care related decisions). 
27. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 2(e) (1993). 
28. This conclusion is reached based on the Author’s examination of the relevant
state laws.  Some states, notably, provide that if the patient’s wishes are not known, the 
surrogate should make the decision based on the patient’s values—a departure from a more
generalized “best interests” approach. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3203(C) (2009). 
 407
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III. THE CONGRUENCE PROBLEM
A primary goal of appointing surrogate decisionmakers is to ensure the 
treatment decisions made for individuals are those the individuals would 
have made for themselves if able to do so.  Where a surrogate’s decision
matches the decision the patient would have made, the decisions are said 
to be “congruent.”  Where the two diverge, they are said to be “incongruent.” 
This Part reviews the social science literature on both the incidence of 
incongruency and causal explanations for it.  At the outset, however, it is 
important to note that this literature, although extensive and very informative,
has significant limitations.  After all, it is not possible to conclusively 
determine whether or not surrogate decisionmakers make the decisions 
incapacitated patients would make for themselves.  Such determinations 
require speculation and counterfactual reasoning because, by definition, 
incapacitated persons cannot make the relevant decisions.  To understand 
the extent and causes of incongruency, social scientists must therefore 
compare surrogates’ decisions to those that patients with capacity believe
they would make for their future, incapacitated selves.  Thus, researchers 
generally examine issues of congruence by asking an individual with
capacity to predict his or her own future health care treatment choices and 
simultaneously asking the individual’s surrogate to indicate the treatment
decision that the surrogate would make under the same conditions.  Naturally,
such studies have limitations.  Most fundamentally, these studies are based 
on the assumption that surrogates and patients have similar decisionmaking 
patterns in hypothetical and actual treatment situations. In addition, they
generally evaluate congruence based solely on a patient’s pre-incapacity
wishes even though people have difficulty with “affective forecasting,” 
that is, predicting future emotional states and reactions.29  Despite these
limitations, such studies provide valuable—albeit somewhat discouraging—
insight into how surrogate decisionmakers make decisions on behalf of
patients. 
First and foremost, the extensive literature on surrogate decisionmaking 
in the health care context suggests that surrogate decisionmakers frequently 
make choices for patients that are inconsistent with what the patients 
would have done.  A systematic review by Shalowitz et al. surveyed forty 
years of research on surrogate decisionmaking to identify sixteen studies 
that provided quantitative data on surrogates’ ability to accurately predict
patients’ choices.30  These studies typically presented patients and their 
29. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective 
Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155, 219–21 (2005). 
30. David I. Shalowitz et al., The Accuracy of Surrogate Decision Makers: A 
Systematic Review, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 493, 494 (2006). 
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surrogates with hypothetical scenarios requiring a decision about medical
treatment, and then compared the decision the patient would have made 
with that made by the surrogate for the patient.31  Looking across the
sixteen studies—representing a total of nearly 20,000 patient-surrogate 
paired responses—the study found that surrogates predicted patients’
treatment preferences with on average only 68% accuracy.32  Notably, the
level of congruence did not appear to vary based on whether the surrogate 
was chosen by the patient or assigned according to a statutory hierarchy 
of default surrogate decisionmakers.33  Subsequent studies, including those
seeking to explain this lack of congruence, have further documented the 
failure of surrogates to accurately predict patients’ treatment preferences.34 
31. Id.  Because nine of the sixteen studies assessed congruence based on a scale of
how likely the patient and surrogate were to make particular treatment decisions, the 
reviewers “collapsed” surrogates’ treatment decisions into two categories: those that 
would result in treatment and those that would not.  Id.  The reviewers treated “uncertain” 
responses as falling within the treatment category “based on recommendations that 
physicians treat patients under conditions of uncertainty.” Id.
 32. Id.  Notably, this rate of agreement is most likely significantly higher than the
rate of actual, conscious agreement, because it fails to account for chance agreement.  A 
better measure of actual agreement would be Cohen’s kappa, which measures the 
difference between the observed and expected levels agreement. See Kohn & Blumenthal, 
supra note 12, at 998 n.85. 
33. See Shalowitz et al., supra note 30, at 495–96 (finding that, across the sixteen
studies examined, patient-selected surrogates had an approximately 69% accuracy rate 
whereas legally-assigned surrogates had an approximately 68% accuracy rate); accord
Daniel P. Sulmasy et al., More Talk, Less Paper: Predicting the Accuracy of Substituted 
Judgments, 96 AM. J. MED. 432, 435 tbl.V (1994) (finding no relationship between a 
surrogate’s predictive accuracy and whether the surrogate was patient-selected or chosen 
by state law).
34. See Jessica Bryant et al., The Accuracy of Surrogate Decision Makers: Informed 
Consent in Hypothetical Acute Stroke Scenarios, 13 BIOMED CENT. EMERGENCY MED. 1,
3 (2013) (reporting in a study of surrogate decisionmaking for stroke-related care that 
“surrogates predicted patients’ treatment preferences with 76.5% crude agreement;
however, the kappa statistics for each scenario indicated poor agreement”); Magali Ciroldi 
et al., Ability of Family Members to Predict Patient’s Consent to Critical Care Research, 
33 INTENSIVE CARE MED. 807, 809 (2007) (examining congruency of French patients and
their surrogates in two scenarios and finding 32% discrepancy in one and 42% discrepancy
in the other); Anand V. Mantravadi, Accuracy of Surrogate Decision Making in Elective 
Surgery, 33 J. CATARACT & REFRACTIVE SURGERY 2091, 2093–94 (2007) (finding that 
patients’ self-selected surrogates predicted patients’ preferences for cataract surgery in the
hypothetical event the patient had dementia with a rate of accuracy 34%; however, 97% 
of proxies were confident in their predictions in that scenario); Melissa A.Z. Marks & Hal 
R. Arkes, Patient and Surrogate Disagreement in End-of-Life Decisions: Can Surrogates 
Accurately Predict Patients’ Preferences?, 28  MED. DECISION MAKING 524, 528 (2008)
(finding that surrogates incorrectly predicted patients’ preferences for cariopulmonary
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The lack of congruence between decisions made by healthcare surrogates 
and those made directly by patients may be attributable to a variety of 
factors. Some of these factors may seem relatively benign.  Surrogates 
may simply be unaware of patients’ treatment preferences or even their 
underlying values.  For example, Reamy et al. studied 266 dyads composed 
of “an individual with mild to moderate dementia and his or her family 
caregiver.”35 They found that caregivers consistently reported that patients 
cared less about five key values—autonomy, burden on others, control, 
family, and safety—than patients actually did.36  Such lack of familiarity 
may be attributable to a variety of factors, including patients failing to discuss
their wishes with surrogates, surrogates forgetting the content of discussions
that occurred, or surrogates believing patients’ wishes at the time of incapacity
would be different than their wishes at the time discussed. 
Another factor that may contribute to high levels of incongruence is that 
surrogates may not be aware of the limits of their knowledge, instead 
misjudging their degree of familiarity with and understanding of patients’ 
preferences. Research indicates that surrogates often have a false sense 
of confidence in their ability to predict patients’ preferences accurately.37 
For example, a study examining spouses’ predictions of whether patients 
would want cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) found that spouses who
expressed confidence that they knew what their partner would want were 
not more accurate than those who lacked such confidence.38  Indeed, both 
surrogates and patients may be overconfident as to surrogates’ ability to 
predict patients’ wishes.  In another study in which surrogates predicted
patients’ treatment preferences at a rate no better than chance, both 
surrogates and patients believed that the surrogate knew the patients’ 
wishes.39 
resuscitation 26% of the time and patients’ preferences related to balancing extended life
versus relief from pain 35% of the time); Julia T. Newman et al., Surrogate and Patient
Discrepancy Regarding Consent for Critical Care Research, 40 CRITICAL CARE MED. 
2590 (2012) (finding in a study of patients in a medical intensive care unit and their
surrogate decisionmakers’ willingness to consent to seven hypothetical research scenarios 
that the kappa “values for all seven scenarios demonstrated less than moderate agreement” 
and that agreement decreased as the risk associated with the proposed research increased). 
35. Allison M. Reamy et al., Understanding Discrepancy in Perceptions of Values: 
Individuals with Mild to Moderate Dementia and Their Family Caregivers, 51 
GERONTOLOGIST 473, 475 (2011). 
36. Id. at 478–79. 
37. See VICTOR G. CICIRELLI, FAMILY CAREGIVING: AUTONOMOUS AND PATERNALISTIC 
DECISION MAKING 104 (1992); Suhl et al., supra note 15, at 94–95. 
38. Richard F. Uhlmann et al., Physicians’ and Spouses’ Predictions of Elderly 
Patients’ Resuscitation Preferences, 43 J. GERONTOLOGY M115, M117 (1988).
39.  Suhl et al., supra note 15, at 93. 
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The lack of congruence may also stem from surrogates’ susceptibility
to another form of “wishful thinking,” that is, surrogates may assume that
patients want what surrogates want for them.  Marks and Arkes examined
144 patient-surrogate dyads in which the surrogate and patient disagreed
as to preferences for CPR, and 294 such dyads where there was disagreement
as to whether palliative treatment should be provided even if it would 
result in an earlier death.40 The researchers found that in both scenarios, 
what surrogates wanted for patients was a statistically significant predictor of
what they had predicted patients wanted for themselves.41 
Less benignly, surrogates may deliberately deviate from patients’
wishes because they believe that complying with them would cause an
immoral or otherwise undesirable result.  Numerous studies have shown 
that surrogates sometimes choose to ignore or override known patient 
preferences.42 Moreover, they may do so even when overriding the patient’s
wishes does not benefit the patient.  For example, in one study, nearly one-
third of surrogate decisionmakers for nursing home residents surveyed 
consented to the resident’s participation in a medical study even though 
they believed the resident would not have done so and the research would 
not personally benefit the resident.43 
Still other research demonstrates that surrogates often plan to make 
decisions about treatment based at least partly on their own values.44 
These values may differ from patients’ values and preferences, thus leading 
to incongruent decisions.45  Such differences in values may be inherent to 
40. Marks & Arkes, supra note 34, at 527. 
41. Id. at 529. Given the limitations of the study design, the researchers were unable 
to determine whether this effect was conscious.  Id.
 42. See, e.g., Elizabeth K. Vig et al., Beyond Substituted Judgment: How Surrogates 
Navigate End-of-Life Decision-Making, 54 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 1688, 1690–91 
(2006) (reporting that a subset of surrogate decisionmakers for chronically ill veterans 
would make decisions contrary to the veterans’ known wishes). 
43. See John W. Warren et al., Informed Consent by Proxy: An Issue in Research
with Elderly Patients, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1124, 1127 (1986). 
44.  Vig et al., supra note 42, at 1690–91. 
45. See Laraine Winter & Susan M. Parks, Elders’ Preferences for Life-Prolonging
Treatment and Their Proxies’ Substituted Judgment: Influence of the Elders’ Current 
Health, 24 J. AGING & HEALTH 1157, 1170 (2012) [hereinafter Winter & Parks, Elders’
Preferences]. In another study, Winter and Parks found that “reluctance to burden others” 
predicted older adults’ preferences for end-of-life treatment.  Laraine Winter & Susan M.
Parks, The Reluctance to Burden Others as a Value in End-of-Life Decision Making: A 
Source of Inaccuracy in Substituted Judgment, 17 J. HEALTH PSYCHOL. 179, 183 (2011).
Proxies’ tendency to put less weight on this factor relative to principals thus may result in 
incongruent treatment decisions. Id. at 184. 
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the individuals making them.  Alternatively, they may reflect the fact that
individuals’ priorities can vary depending on their circumstances, and that 
the surrogate and the patient are at different places in their lives. 
There is also a significant tendency for surrogates to project their own 
preferences onto patients.  In a study of patients and those individuals likely
to be chosen as their surrogates, Zweibel and Cassel found that those 
likely to be chosen as surrogates predicted patients’ treatment preferences 
with only 63% accuracy.46  There was a very strong correlation, however, 
between what the likely surrogates said they would want for themselves and 
what they predicted the patients would want.  Surrogates overwhelmingly— 
ranging from 93% to 95% of the time, depending on the scenario—selected 
the treatment for the patient that they indicated they would want for
themselves in the same situation.47 
A similar pattern of projection was found in a study by Fagerlin et al. 
that paired undergraduate students with the students’ parents.48  After the 
two engaged in a discussion of end-of-life issues together, the parents 
were surveyed about their treatment preferences as to a variety of serious 
healthcare decisions, and students were surveyed as to what they believed
their parents would want.49 The study found that the best predictor of what
students thought their parents would want is what the students wanted for
themselves in same situations.50  While there was only a 64% rate of agreement 
between parents’ preferences and students’ predictions of parents’
preferences, there was a 78% rate of agreement between what students 
predicted parents would want and what students wanted for themselves.51 
Fagerlin et al. also ran a parallel study with older adults (mean age 73.7 
years) and their self-selected surrogates.52 Although there was a markedly
higher rate of congruence in this study—surrogates accurately predicted
principals’ preferences 72% of the time—surrogates’ preference for their 
own care were still the best predictor of what the surrogate reported the 
principal would choose; 80% of the time, surrogates believed principals 
would choose what the surrogates wanted for themselves.53 
46. See Nancy R. Zweibel & Christine K. Cassel, Treatment Choices at the End of
Life: A Comparison of Decisions by Older Patients and Their Physician-Selected Proxies, 
29 GERONTOLOGIST 615, 618 (1989) (more specifically, surrogates made a treatment 
decision that was the opposite of what the patient would make between 24% and 50% of
the time, depending on the decision; findings were based on a sample of 55 patient-surrogate 
dyads). 
47. See id. at 618–19. 
48. Fagerlin et al., supra note 15, at 168–69. 
49. Id. at 167–68. 
50. Id. at 169–70. 
51. Id. at 169. 
52. Id. at 171. 
53. Id. at 171–73. 
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Likewise, Moorman et al. analyzed data from 2750 married couples in 
their mid-60s.54  They found that spouses reported each other’s preferences
for life sustaining care at a rate only slightly better than chance.55  The 
study found that the patterns of congruence witnessed were consistent 
with spouses projecting their own care preferences onto one another.56 
More recently, McDade-Montez et al. studied dyads of newly married 
couples.  The researchers asked the couples to predict end-of-life preferences 
for one another.  The study found that the newly married individuals’ 
predictions as to their spouses’ end-of-life treatment preferences were more 
closely related to their own treatment preferences than to their spouses’
treatment preferences.57  This finding was true for both husbands and 
wives.58  The researchers attributed the finding to spouses’ assumed
similarity, that is, spouses assumed that their spouses had similar beliefs.
Notably, the researchers found that wives were less accurate in predicting
husbands’ preferences where the two members of the couple had greater
differences in spirituality, moral strictness, and conservativeness; however,
such differences did not affect husbands’ predictive accuracy.59 
While surrogates’ tendency to project their own values on patients is 
often discussed as if it is subconscious, surrogates may sometimes be
aware that they are projecting.  A qualitative study of decisionmaking for 
patients with end-stage dementia in Germany found that relatives who had 
been appointed as surrogate decisionmakers, either by the patient or 
through a guardianship proceeding, referred to their own preferences to
explain why they would make a particular choice in 22% of decisions.60 
Likewise, in a qualitative study involving structured interviews of fifty 
surrogate decisionmakers for older, chronically ill veterans, Vig et al. found 
that a subset of the surrogates explicitly said they would consider their
54. See Sara M. Moorman et al., Do Older Adults Know Their Spouses’ End-of-Life 
Treatment Preferences?, 31  J. AGING RES. 463, 470 (2009). 
55. Id. at 476. 
56. See id. at 480. By contrast, the study found that neither the surrogate’s 
appointment as a health care agent pursuant to a health care proxy nor discussions between
the surrogate and patient as to the patient’s care preferences predicted congruence.  Id.
57.  Elizabeth McDade-Montez et al., Similarity, Agreement, and Assumed Similarity in
Proxy End-of-Life Decision Making, 31  FAMILIES, SYS. & HEALTH 366, 377 (2013). 
58. Id.
 59. Id.
60. Ralf J. Jox, Surrogate Decision Making for Patients with End-Stage Dementia, 
27 INT’L J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 1045, 1048 (2012). By contrast, professional guardians 
rarely referred to their own preferences.  Id.  It should be noted that the sample size was 
very small. 
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own personal beliefs when making end-of-life decisions for the patients,
and some admitted that they would consider their own needs as part of the 
decisionmaking process.61 
IV. CURRENT STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING CONGRUENCE
There have been numerous recommendations for improving congruence in
treatment decisions. 
A common recommendation is that surrogates be selected based on their
relationship with the patient.62  This is consistent with the conventional
wisdom that surrogates who are closely related to patients or who otherwise 
know them well are in the best position to predict patients’ treatment
preferences.63  Thus, attorneys, medical professionals, and others who help 
patients execute advance directives frequently advise patients to select a 
surrogate who knows them well, who is familiar with their wishes, and
whom they trust.  This approach is also adopted in the specific hierarchies 
established by default surrogate decisionmaking statutes,64 and is consistent 
with current practices for appointing guardians for incapacitated persons.65 
Despite the prominence of this approach and the expectation that those 
who are closely related to the patient will know the patient’s wishes, the
research suggests that the degree of relatedness between a patient and a 
family member acting as a surrogate does not predict surrogate accuracy.66 
That said, compared to physicians, surrogates who are family members of
the patient tend to make treatment decisions that are more consistent with 
the patient’s wishes.67  Accordingly, while choosing family members may 
61. See Vig et al., supra note 42, at 1690–91. 
62. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
63. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
64. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
65. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
66. See Shalowitz et al., supra note 30, at 496 (reviewing four studies and finding
that a surrogate’s familial relationship to a patient was not correlated with accuracy).
67. See Susanna E. Bedell & Thomas L. Delbanco, Choices About Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation in the Hospital: When Do Physicians Talk With Patients?, 310 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1089, 1091 (1984) (concluding that physicians’ opinions as to patients’ desire for
life-sustaining measures correlates poorly with preferences expressed by patients); Kristen 
M. Coppola et al., Accuracy of Primary Care and Hospital-Based Physicians’ Predictions 
of Elderly Outpatients’ Treatment Preferences with and Without Advance Directives, 161
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 431, 431 (2001); Joseph G. Ouslander et al., Health Care 
Decisions Among Elderly Long-Term Care Residents and Their Potential Proxies, 149 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1367, 1369, 1371 (1989); Príncipe-Rodríguez et al., supra note 
15, at 408; Allison B. Seckler et al., Substituted Judgment: How Accurate Are Proxy 
Predictions?, 115 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 92, 95 (1991); Shalowitz et al., supra note 30, 
at 496; Uhlmann et al., supra note 38, M117–19; see also Tom Tomlinson et al., An
Empirical Study of Proxy Consent for Elderly Persons, 30 GERONTOLOGIST 54, 59 (1990)
(reporting that “[c]lose family members performed slightly better than physicians in
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be good practice, when choosing among relatives, degree of relatedness 
should not be expected to predict congruency.68 
Another frequently recommended strategy for increasing congruence is 
for patients to discuss their wishes with their selected surrogate.  Indeed, 
there are currently a number of nonprofit organizations leading efforts 
designed specifically to encourage such conversations.69  However, such
discussions do not necessarily increase the likelihood that the surrogate 
will make the decision the patient would have made.  Indeed, many studies 
suggest that such discussion is of little value in improving surrogates’
substantive accuracy.70  This appears to be true when the patient and surrogate
discuss the patient’s specific treatment preferences71 as well as when they
discuss the patient’s values related to treatment.72  There is some limited 
evidence that such discussion may improve surrogates’ understanding of
patients’ personal beliefs about the process by which decisions should be 
made, but that this understanding does not lead to improved congruency
with regard to specific treatment decisions.73 
reflecting the elderly person’s wishes”; however, that finding was not statistically significant,
and was true for proxies making substituted judgments, but not for “general proxies,” who 
were slightly—but not statistically significantly—worse than physicians).  On a positive 
note, physicians may recognize their limitations in this regard.  See Seckler et al., supra, 
at 94–95 (finding that physicians reported only 59% confidence that their decisions 
accurately reflect patient wishes).
68. Notably, however, existing studies examining the impact of degree of relatedness of
typically examine differences among closely related relatives.  Degree of relatedness 
might well predict congruence if close relatives were compared to quite distant relatives. 
69. See, e.g., THE CONVERSATION PROJECT, www.theconversationproject.org [http:// 
perma.cc/SE4C-J6WW] (last visited Apr. 20, 2015). 
70. See Peter H. Ditto et al., Advance Directives as Acts of Communication: A
Randomized Controlled Trial, 161 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 421, 426 (2001); Angela 
Fagerlin et al., The Use of Advance Directives in End-of-Life Decision Making: Problems 
and Possibilities, 46 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 268, 275–76 (2002) (citing the Ditto study); 
Smucker et al., supra note 15. However, prior discussion between surrogates and patients 
was found to improve accuracy in a study by Suhl et al., supra note 15, at 94.  That said, 
in that study, the patients self-reported the amount of such discussion and this may have 
influenced the results.  Id.
 71. See, e.g., Ditto et al., supra note 70, at 426; Moorman et al., supra note 54, at 463. 
72. See, e.g., Carol Matheis-Kraft & Karen A. Roberto, Influence of a Values 
Discussion on Congruence Between Elderly Women and Their Families on Critical Health
Care Decisions, 9 J. WOMEN & AGING 5 (1997) (finding that prior discussion of values 
between patients and their proxies impacted proxy accuracy but acknowledging 
methodological limitations).
73. Robert A. Pearlman et al., Improvements in Advance Care Planning in the 
Veterans Affairs System, 165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 667, 671 (2005) (finding that an
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A third type of intervention designed to improve surrogates’ substantive
accuracy is to specifically instruct surrogates to use substituted judgment.
There is some evidence to indicate that this intervention has utility.  For 
example, some studies have found that family members and patient-selected 
surrogates make decisions that are more consistent with patients’ wishes 
when explicitly told to use substituted judgment.74  In a recent study of
decisionmaking by guardians, Whitton and Frolik compared how guardians
make personal and healthcare decisions for persons subject to guardianship
in a state that requires guardians to make decisions in the “best interest”
of the person subject to guardianship with how guardians make such
decisions in states that require guardians to use substituted judgment
where there is evidence of what the person would want.75  Compared to 
guardians in the jurisdictions with substituted judgment standards, guardians 
in the state with a “best interests” standard reported that they placed greater 
weight on the views of family members, family harmony and consensus, 
and what the guardian would want in the same circumstances when
making decisions for a person subject to guardianship.76  These findings
suggest that the decisionmaking standard that surrogates are instructed to 
use may affect how they make decisions, and that a best interests standard 
is detrimental to the cause of congruent decisionmaking.77  Other research, 
however, has not found that instructing surrogates to use substituted 
judgment has a statistically significant effect.  For example, in a study on 
decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment, patient-selected surrogates 
who were instructed to make treatment decisions based on what the 
patient would choose were not statistically more did not achieve a level 
of congruence that was statistically greater than what would be expected
intervention that increased advance care planning discussions between patients and surrogates 
did not improve congruence as to treatment preferences and values, but did somewhat
improve the ability of proxies to predict patients’ “personal beliefs,” beliefs which were
largely related to decisionmaking processes). 
74. See, e.g., Tomlinson et al., supra note 67, at 59 (finding that close family
members—including patient-selected surrogates—were no better than treating physicians 
at making decisions that were consistent with patients’ wishes unless explicitly told to use 
substituted judgment). 
75. Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik, Surrogate Decision-Making Standards 
for Guardians: Theory and Reality, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1491, 1526–29 (2012). 
76. Id.
77. Since the study relied on self-reports, however, it is possible that the effect 
observed is not on the actual processes that are used but on what processes guardians claim 
to use, either because they sincerely believe they use those processes or because they wish 
to appear compliant with state law.  It is also possible that differences in processes do not
lead to differences in outcomes. 
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by chance.78  Thus, while instructing surrogates to use substituted judgment
may hold promise, this intervention alone cannot be expected to “fix” the 
problem of incongruency.
Finally, some scholars have proposed abandoning, in whole or in part, 
the substituted judgment model in favor of models that seem more likely
to result in congruent decisions.  For example, Houts et al. have suggested
that treatment decisions may be more consistent with patient wishes if
they are based not on substituted judgment, but rather on an actuarial
model in which decisions are made by looking to what others are known 
to have chosen in like circumstances.79  Others have suggested that decisions
simply be made based on the best interests of the patient.80  A fundamental 
problem with such alternative models is that even if they significantly
improve congruency as to treatment decisions, they may not result in a 
decisionmaking process that is any more consistent with patients’ overall 
wishes. This is because congruency is not the only goal of surrogate 
decisionmaking.  Another important goal for many patients is that their 
family, or certain members of their family, be involved in the decisionmaking 
process.81  Indeed, many people report that they “are less concerned with 
the specific treatment decisions that are made than about having the decisions 
made by someone they trust.”82  Such alternative models do not account
for patients’ desire for family involvement in the decision making process.
78. Hare et al., supra note 15, at 1049.  Despite 70% agreement, the kappa statistics 
were not significantly different from zero; thus, corrected agreement was not significantly
different from chance. 
79. Renate M. Houts et al., Predicting Elderly Outpatients’ Life-Sustaining
Treatment Preferences over Time: The Majority Rules, 22 MED. DECISION MAKING 39, 49 
(2002) (suggesting that such a model could, for example, “guide” surrogates making
decisions without an advance directive and guard against certain types of predictive
errors).
80. See, e.g., Kristine BǙrǛe, Patient Autonomy, Assessment of Competence and
Surrogate Decision-Making: A Call for Reasonableness in Deciding for Others, 24  
BIOETHICS 87, 93–94 (2010) (arguing in favor of using teams to make decisions in the best 
interests of incapacitated patients). 
81. In a literature review examining patients’ goals for surrogate decisionmaking
processes, Kelly et al. identified three goals that individuals have for surrogate decisionmaking
in the context of health care: “involve their family, be[] treated consistently with their own
preferences and values, and minimize the burden on their family.”  Brenna Kelly et al., 
Systematic Review: Individuals’ Goals for Surrogate Decision-Making, 60 J. AM. GERIATRICS
SOC’Y 884, 894 (2012). 
82. Fagerlin et al., supra note 70, at 278.  It is worth questioning, however, whether
their faith in trusted others would persist if fully aware of the research cited in this Article. 
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Thus, existing proposals may well improve congruency, but they fall 
far short of providing a complete solution to the problem of incongruency.
The next Part therefore proposes a new approach to surrogate decisionmaking 
that should, if not replace, at least supplement existing strategies for improving 
congruence. 
V. A NEW APPROACH TO SURROGATE SELECTION
As discussed in Part III, research consistently suggests that because 
surrogates tend to project their own preferences, the best predictor of 
surrogates’ decisions on behalf of patients is surrogates’ preferences for
themselves in the same situation.83  While researchers typically portray 
this tendency as a barrier to appropriate decisionmaking or as a challenge 
to be overcome,84 this Part shows how it can be capitalized on to improve
surrogate decisionmaking.  Specifically, it explains how those selecting 
surrogate decisionmakers—whether they be individuals executing advance 
directives, judges appointing guardians, or policymakers designing systems
for selecting legal surrogates—can increase congruency by capitalizing 
on surrogates’ tendency to project their own values and preferences. 
A. A Shared Preferences and Values Approach to 
Surrogate Selection 
The repeated finding that surrogates’ preferences for their own treatment
predict the decisions they make for others indicates that surrogates selected 
based on the extent to which they share patients’ preferences and values 
are likely to achieve a higher rate of congruency than are surrogates selected 
based on conventional factors. Therefore, I propose that all three types of 
healthcare agents should be selected based, at least in part, on the extent 
to which they share patients’ treatment-related preferences.  When treatment 
preferences cannot be compared, or when the individual cares less about
individual treatment decisions than about consistency with a set of values, 
then surrogates should be selected based on shared values. 
This proposal differs significantly from existing recommendations that 
surrogate decisionmakers should consider patients’ values when making 
treatment preferences, or that a discussion of values should be part of the 
83. See supra notes 46–61 and accompanying text. 
84. See, e.g., McDade-Montez et al., supra note 57, at 377 (suggesting that surrogate
decisionmaking might be improved by discussing family members’ biases and recognizing 
the potential impact of surrogates’ own preferences on end-of-life decisionmaking); 
Zweibel & Cassel, supra note 46, at 620 (describing projection as a source of error). 
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conversation that patients have with their surrogates.85  This proposal brings 
the role of values into the surrogate decisionmaking process at an earlier
stage: to consider values not only when determining how the surrogate 
should act but also to consider values when determining who should act 
as surrogate. 
When matching surrogates and patients based on values, a perfect match 
will rarely be possible.  The challenge, therefore, is to identify the values 
that are most important for the patient and surrogate to share. 
As a general matter, the greatest weight should be placed on values that 
have the greatest impact on the most important and fundamental treatment
choices, such as those about whether to consent to life-sustaining treatment
and those that involve significant tradeoffs between quality and length of 
life. Three types of values should therefore be given special consideration:
(1) values that are most predictive of treatment choices, (2) values that 
remain stable over time, and (3) foundational values that individuals employ
to prioritize among other values.86  Values related to prioritizing among 
competing goals are critically important because many of the most difficult 
and fundamental healthcare decisions involve making tradeoffs between
desired outcomes, such as between minimizing pain and prolonging life. 
Existing research provides some insight into which types of values are 
likely to meet these criteria.  McDade-Montez et al. found that differences 
in spirituality, moral strictness, and conservativeness between newlywed 
husbands and wives correlated with wives making less accurate predictions
of husbands’ preferences.87  Thus, surrogates who are similar in terms of 
these three characteristics may be preferable to those who are not.  Research 
indicating which values are most predictive of patients’ own treatment 
choices may also be used to identify which values are particularly important 
to share 88 because surrogates tend to project their own values. 
85. See, e.g., Leslie P. Scheunemann et al., The Facilitated Values History: Helping
Surrogates Make Authentic Decisions for Incapacitated Patients with Advanced Illness, 
186 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 480, 480 (2012) (arguing that surrogates 
need to understand patients’ values and that such values should be discussed with
surrogates).
86. Cf. Michele J. Karel et al., Three Methods of Assessing Values for Advance Care 
Planning: Comparing Persons with and Without Dementia, 19 J. AGING & HEALTH 123, 
145 (2007) (arguing, in a study of methods for assessing patient values, that the most 
important values to consider are those related to prioritization). 
87.  McDade-Montez et al., supra note 57, at 377. 
88. Scheunemann et al. provide a list of values based on a review of the literature 
that appear to be relevant to end-of-life decisions.  They include longevity, maintenance 
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Nevertheless, further research would be helpful to obtain a clearer 
picture of which values are most important to treatment decisions.  As 
current research on the impact of values on treatment decisions tends to 
examine the impact of patients’ values and not the impact of surrogates’ 
values, research that directly looks at the impact of surrogates’ values on 
their treatment decisions would be particularly beneficial. 
B. Operationalizing a Shared Preferences and Values
Approach to Surrogate Selection 
The manner in which a shared preferences and values approach to
surrogate selection should be operationalized depends on the type of 
surrogate.  Those executing advance directives should be counseled to
consider potential surrogates’ own treatment preferences and values when
selecting their health care agent and to consider favoring surrogates with
similar values and preferences.  Thus, as part of the surrogate selection
process, an individual should not only discuss his or her own preferences 
with potential surrogates but should also discuss the potential surrogates’
preferences for their own care.89  Such discussions are likely to be of 
particular value when young persons are being considered as potential 
surrogates because some evidence suggests that younger surrogates are 
more likely to engage in projection.90 
Similarly, courts should take into account potential guardians’ health 
care related preferences and values when choosing whom to appoint.
Courts should favor those individuals whose preferences for their own 
care appear to mirror, or at least to be closely aligned with, what the 
person subject to guardianship is known—or, if actual knowledge is not
feasible, reasonably believed—to have wanted.  If the person’s relevant 
of bodily integrity, maintenance of physical function, maintenance of cognitive function,
autonomy and independence, social and emotional engagement, avoidance of burdensome
physical symptoms, and adherence to religious or spiritual beliefs.  See Scheunemann et 
al., supra note 85, at 481.  Investigating these values would be an excellent starting place. 
89. Just as other aspects of an advance directive should be reevaluated on a regular 
basis, the choice of surrogate should be reevaluated as well, in part to ensure that the 
surrogate and the patient have not diverged in their values and preferences since the time 
of original appointment.  Fortunately, the existing research base suggests that many values
related to important healthcare decisions are fairly stable. For example, in a study of the 
values of patients both with and without dementia, Karel et al. found that both groups had
relatively stable preferences as to the value they placed on quality versus quantity of life,
the use of pain medications, where and from whom they wished to receive care, and 
feelings about dying. See Karel et al., supra note 86, at 145–46. 
90. Fagerlin et al., supra note 15, at 169–70, 172 (finding that surrogates in their
study of undergraduate-parent dyads were slightly more likely to project than surrogates
in their study of older adults and patient-chosen surrogates; notably, however, students 
picked a parent to participate in the first study).
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preferences cannot be ascertained, then the court should favor appointment
of individuals whose health care related values appear consistent with 
those of the person subject to guardianship.
Finally, states should allow default surrogate decisionmakers to be
selected based in part on their personal beliefs, not merely their familial
status.91  For example, instead of prioritizing potential surrogates based on
their relationship to the patients, states could authorize a group of “interested 
persons” to, based on a facilitated discussion, select a surrogate for the
patient whose relevant preferences and values most closely match those 
of the patient.92  A more conservative alternative would be for states to 
continue to adhere to priority lists based on relationship but to allow the 
extent to which potential surrogates’ preferences and values match those 
of the incapacitated patient to determine whom is selected as a surrogate 
within a common class—for example, which adult child or which sibling 
is selected. 
Fully implementing a shared preferences and values approach to surrogate
selection will require law reform.  Changes to state statutes authorizing 
default surrogate decisionmakers will be necessary in most states in order 
for a surrogate’s own preferences and values to be given adequate consideration 
 421
 91.  Jeremy Blumenthal and I suggested this idea in an earlier article, including it as 
one of several ways default surrogate decisionmaking processes might be improved upon.  
See Kohn & Blumenthal, supra note 12, at 1011–13. 
 92.  As Jeremy Blumenthal and I suggested in a discussion of potential reforms to 
default surrogate decisionmaking laws: 
States could consider modifying Colorado’s current default surrogate statute.  
That statute specifies that: 
It shall be the responsibility of the interested persons [i.e., the patient’s 
spouse, parent, adult child, sibling, grandchild, or close friend] . . . to make 
reasonable efforts to reach a consensus as to whom among them shall make 
medical treatment decisions on behalf of the patient.  The person selected 
to act as the patient’s proxy decision-maker should be the person who has 
a close relationship with the patient and who is most likely to be currently 
informed of the patient’s wishes regarding medical treatment decisions. 
   A modified statute, which takes into account and capitalizes on surrogates’ 
tendencies to project, might change the second sentence to read as follows: 
The person selected to act as the patient’s proxy decision-maker should be 
the person who has a close relationship with the patient, who most closely 
shares the patient’s values and beliefs regarding medical treatment, and 
who is most likely to be currently informed of the patient’s wishes regarding 
medical treatment decisions. 
Kohn & Blumenthal, supra note 12, at 1012–13 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18.5-
103(4)(a) (2007)) (including this suggestion as part of a series of suggestions for improving 
default surrogate decisionmaking statutes). 





















when selecting default surrogate decision makers.  Likewise, it would be
appropriate to amend statutes guiding judicial selection of guardians to 
explicitly instruct judges to consider shared values and preferences.
However, a shared preferences and shared values approach could be 
largely implemented with no legal reform.  Most surrogate decisionmakers 
are selected by patients themselves, without any court involvement and 
with minimal legal constraints.  Attorneys and others counseling would-
be patients should urge those individuals to consider potential surrogates’
values when determining whom to select. Would-be patients should consider
interviewing potential surrogates by asking them what they would want 
done for themselves in situations of importance to the principal.  Likewise, in
the context of guardianship, statutory reform would also be desirable but 
may not be necessary, as judges have significant discretion in selecting 
whom to appoint as a guardian.
Of course, none of the three systems could operationalize a shared 
preferences and values approach to surrogate selection with perfect precision. 
It is impossible to ensure that surrogates and patients have precisely the 
same set of preferences or values.  Even setting aside the problem that no 
two people are exactly alike, assessing the degree to which preferences 
and values are shared is complicated by the fact that the preferences of an 
incapacitated person can never truly be known and the fact that a person’s
status as the patient may itself affect his or her preferences and values.
Indeed, individuals’ health status interacts with their health care preferences, 
with the value that people place on their life (and thus on potentially life-
saving treatment) tending to increase as their health status worsens.93 
Although surrogates’ decisions for patients are also affected by changes 
in patients’ health status, the nature of the interaction appears to be different
for patients than it is for surrogates.94  Thus, judging patients’ health care 
related preferences based on similarity between patients’ pre-incapacity 
values and their post-incapacity values may give an incomplete picture of
their wishes.
In short, although a shared preferences and shared values approach to 
surrogate selection cannot ensure congruence, it has the potential to
meaningfully increase the rate of congruency.
93.  Winter & Parks, Elders’ Preferences, supra note 45, at 1170. 
422
 94.  Winter and Parks found that both patient and surrogate preferences depended 
on an interaction between current health status and hypothetical, worsened health 
conditions such that both displayed a greater preference for life-sustaining treatment for 
less healthy patients.  For principals, the interaction occurred primarily at the extremes, 
strongly affecting preferences where the health condition was either very bad—for example, 
after suffering a severe stroke—or no different from their current condition.  By contrast, 
proxies’ preferences for life-sustaining treatment increased even with less severe negative 
health conditions.  Id. at 1170–71. 
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C. Advantages of a Shared Preferences and Values Approach 
In addition to encouraging the selection of a surrogate who is more likely 
to make treatment choices that a patient would have made if capable, a 
shared preferences and shared values approach to surrogate selection has 
other advantages. 
One key advantage is that it draws attention to the fact that the healthcare 
decisions that surrogates make are often value-laden. As Scheunemann 
et al. argue, “[a]dvanced illness often raises tradeoffs between quantity
and quality of life,” and that one barrier to good surrogate decisionmaking 
is that surrogates “may misconstrue their role” because they “believe that
treatment decisions hinge on purely medical judgments rather than on 
value-laden ones and therefore underestimate the importance of their input
regarding the patient’s values.”95  Values-based surrogate selection may, 
accordingly, also increase congruence by drawing attention to the role that 
values play in making treatment decisions and thereby encourage more 
relevant and productive discussions among medical providers, surrogates, 
and patients. 
Another advantage of a shared values and preferences approach is that
it encourages more flexible decisionmaking.  Although individuals executing 
advance directives are often urged to provide surrogates with explicit 
instructions as to the care that they do and do not wish to receive, such 
instructions may not result in treatment decisions that are consistent with 
patient preferences. Research on affective forecasting suggests that patients’
own wishes, as expressed in an advance directive or other means, are often
inconsistent with the preferences they express at a later time.96  In addition, 
many patients want their surrogates to have the leeway to make context-
specific decisions.97  Choosing a surrogate based on shared values may 
95.  Scheunemann et al., supra note 85, at 481. 
96. In states that require clear and convincing evidence of patient wishes to
terminate life-sustaining treatment, there may still be a significant need to put some such 
details in the instructions so that the surrogate will be permitted to terminate such treatment. 
97. See Ashwini Sehgal et al., How Strictly Do Dialysis Patients Want Their
Advance Directives Followed?, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 59, 59 (1992) (finding that subjects 
varied widely in the extent of leeway they would grant surrogates to override their 
instructions—“complete leeway” (31%), “a lot of leeway” (11%), “a little leeway” (19%), 
and “no leeway” (39%)—and on the weight to be given to factors such as pain or suffering, 
quality of life, the possibility of a new treatment, indignity caused by continued treatment, 
the financial impact of treatment on family, and religious beliefs); see also Fagerlin et al., 
supra note 70, at 278–79 (“[I]n fact, [patients] commonly desire to let surrogates override 
their living wills if the surrogate thinks it is in the patient’s best interest.”); Nikki Ayers
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reduce the extent to which patients need, or think they need, to reify
treatment preferences in their health care proxies and thus may facilitate 
the type of context-specific decisionmaking that patients often favor. 
Finally, selecting surrogates based on shared values and preferences, as 
opposed to on conventional factors such as trustworthiness, may have 
substantial psychic benefits for both patients and their families.  In many 
cases, individuals selecting surrogates face the unpleasant choice of choosing 
between loved ones, such as between their various adult children.  Family
members who are not selected may feel rejected or otherwise insulted.  If 
those selecting surrogates justify their selections based on shared values 
or preferences, the decision may seem less like a referendum on the
trustworthiness or abilities of those not selected and thus cause fewer hurt 
feelings. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Surrogate decisionmakers do a poor job of predicting patients’ treatment 
preferences. By contrast, they do an excellent job of projecting their own 
preferences onto patients.  Health care decisionmaking for incapacitated 
persons can be improved by capitalizing on this phenomenon.  Specifically, 
as this Article has proposed, individuals should be selected as a health 
care surrogate based, at least in part, on the extent to which they share the 
patient’s treatment preferences.  Where patients’ specific preferences are 
not known or where patients care less about specific treatment decisions 
than about making decisions consistent with their underlying values, 
surrogates should be selected based at least in part on the extent to which 
they share patients’ relevant values.  Fully implementing this approach will 
require changing advance planning practices, encouraging judges to
consider shared values and preferences when appointing guardians, and 
revising statutes governing the selection of guardians and default surrogate 
decisionmakers. 
Incorporating a shared preferences and values approach into the practice
and law of surrogate selection could both increase the frequency with 
which surrogates make the decisions patients want made and facilitate more 
context-appropriate treatment decisions.  It is a simple antidote for the 
Hawkins et al., Micromanaging Death: Process Preferences, Values, and Goals in End-
of-Life Medical Decision Making, 45 GERONTOLOGIST 107, 110–11 (2005) (in a study of 
patients age 65 and over, finding that only 9% of patients thought that a surrogate should 
have no leeway to override patient wishes if they believed it was in the patient’s best 
interest, and that over half thought that a surrogate should have “a lot” of leeway or 
“complete” leeway to do so).  The Author suspects that patients might, however, be less willing 
to allow their surrogates leeway if they were aware of the extent to which surrogates ignore 
patients’ wishes. 
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problem of incongruence, but perhaps a reminder that even complex
problems may have simple remedies. 
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